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Britain’s EU Referendum
 A Plausible Pathway to Brexit
The conventional wisdom is that, at a national referendum on 23 June, 
Britain will vote to Remain a member of 
the European Union (EU). This is driven 
by a belief that (1) the ‘fundamentals’ 
of the campaign favour the Remain 
camp, (2) citizens are more risk averse at 
referendums and therefore likely to back 
the status quo, (3) Britons are instinctively 
wary about the perceived economic risks 
and uncertainty that could follow ‘Brexit’, 
and (4) those campaigning for a Leave 
vote are divided and unable to point to a 
single, readily identifiable alternative to 
Britain’s current EU membership. 
It is also true most British people 
expect their country to remain in the 
EU. According to a survey by ORB in 
March 2016, 63% of voters said they 
expected Britain to vote to continue EU 
membership. Such views are mirrored in 
the betting markets, which in late March 
2016 suggested Remain was on course for a 
healthy victory, with an implied 69% chance 
of winning the referendum.
Analysis of the underlying data, however, 
suggests much of the debate may overstate 
the relative strength of the Remain position 
and gloss over several opportunities for 
the Leave camp. While this essay concurs 
that Remain enjoys several strengths, 
not least that a majority of voters remain 
unconvinced by the claim Brexit would 
benefit the economy, examination of 
polling data suggests online polls could 
be artificially inflating support for Brexit. 
This essay also contends that it is possible 
to identify in the data a clear and plausible 
pathway to Brexit. 
Along this pathway lie an ingrained 
tradition of Euroscepticism in Britain, 
unresolved questions about the accuracy of 
polls, evidence on voting patterns at past 
referendums, the dominance in the wider 
climate of immigration over the economy, 
growing dissatisfaction with the incumbent 
Conservative Party government, the 
agnostic stance of Jeremy Corbyn and the 
Labour party, a failure by David Cameron 
and the Remain camp to capitalise fully 
on the EU reform ‘deal’ and evidence that 
pro-Leave voters appear more committed 
to turning out on 23 June. This essay also 
reviews the social and attitudinal profile of 
the key groups of voters who will decide 
the outcome of the referendum, noting how 
this moment in British politics is rooted in a 
clear and growing social divide.
Current polling data and academic 
research
For much of the past year, the Remain 
camp has led the opinion polls. However, 
recently, this lead appears to have eroded. 
According to the ‘Poll of Polls’, for much of 
December 2015, Remain held a comfortable 
ten-point lead, with 55% of votes to Leave’s 
45% (excluding voters who ‘don’t know’ 
how they will vote). Since then, this gap has 
narrowed. At the end of March 2016, the 
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Poll of Polls put Remain only two points 
ahead, with 51% to Leave’s 49%. Across all 
polls conducted in March 2016, including 
the undecided, Remain averaged 43%, 
Leave 41% and the undecided 16%. The gap 
between the two camps is, at the time of 
writing, well within the margin of error.
That the race has tightened is also 
reflected in ‘tracker’ polls conducted over 
the phone and updated regularly. In phone 
polls conducted by Ipsos-MORI, the 
lead for remaining in the EU has steadily 
declined from 44 points in June last year to 
26 points in December, 19 points in January, 
18 points in February and eight points in 
March. Similarly, in the telephone tracker 
carried out by ComRes, Remain’s lead fell 
from 21 points in December to 12 points in 
February and eight points in March.
Fig 1 below presents the overall trend and 
is based on more than 177 polls conducted 
between September 2010 and March 2016. 
In recent months, as debate has intensified 
and despite a continual attempt by political 
and business elites to communicate the 
benefits of EU membership, the race has 
narrowed. While they are a minority, three 
polls in March 2016 put Leave ahead of 
Remain, with online pollsters such as ICM 
recording their highest level of support for a 
Brexit since their tracker began.
To what extent, if at all, might this picture 
change as polling day nears? It is often 
argued that as the referendum nears, voters  Stock / 4 April 2016 
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Fig 1: Trends in support for Remain and Leave options in Referendum on UK membership 
of the European Union 
 
Source: 177 polls conducted between September 2010 and March 2016 
 
 
Fig 2: Results of opinion polls, January-March 2016 (%) 
 ---- Online polls (average) ---- -- Telephone polls (average) -- ----- Combined (average) ----- 
 Remain Leave DK Remain Leave DK Remain Leave DK 
January  43 42 15 55 36 9 45 41 14 
February  40 41 18 50 37 13 43 40 17 
March  43 42 14 48 39 13 44 41 15 
 
Note: DK = don’t know 
Source: all figures calculated by author 
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will increasingly turn toward remaining 
in the EU. The assumption is referendums 
are often decided by a ‘late swing’ towards 
the status quo as more risk-averse citizens 
focus their minds on the vote and the 
implications of a Brexit.
Research on voting patterns at past 
referendums certainly suggests that, as 
polling day nears, citizens often become 
more supportive of the status quo. Analysis 
of 34 referendums around the globe 
between 1980 and 2013 suggests in the 
final month support for the ‘change’ option 
declined in 23 cases and increased in 
eleven. It is also worth noting the drop in 
support for the more radical change option 
exceeded the increase in support in the few 
cases where change gained ground.1 
Yet there is evidence to the contrary 
which throws doubt on the notion the polls 
will change significantly prior to the 23 
June vote. One aspect concerns the way in 
which British society is highly polarised 
over EU membership. The Remain and 
Leave votes are each concentrated among 
groups in society that have had profoundly 
different experiences with Britain’s 
EU membership, through issues like 
immigration and globalisation. Whereas 
support for Remain is anchored amongst 
more educated, younger and middle-aged 
citizens, and those who are often more 
economically secure, support for Leave is 
strongest among people who left school 
at the earliest opportunity, who have little 
economic security, are older and identify 
with being English (rather than British). 
This polarisation suggests that between now 
and the vote there might not be substantial 
change in the polls. 
Another source of evidence worth noting 
is based on analysis of more than 800 
polls from 45 historic referendums held 
in Britain or specifically on EU issues. The 
study found that while support for change 
across referendums tended to decline as 
polling day neared, this did not hold true to 
the same extent for EU referendums. “Most 
importantly,” noted the authors, “there is 
a lot of variation across referendums in 
the extent of these tendencies, so much 
so that there are plenty of cases that go 
in the opposite direction. The experience 
of previous referendums suggests that 
the eventual Remain vote is likely to be 
higher than that in polls currently, but not 
by much – just less than three percentage 
points – and the gap between the current 
A polarised electorate suggests the polls might 
not change substantially before 23 June
1   For example, see the work of academics Lawrence LeDuc and Alan Renwick
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polls and the result is only somewhat more 
likely than not to be positive for Remain 
rather than negative.”2 Clearly, unlike other 
referendums on EU issues – such as the 
votes on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland, the 
EU Constitution in France or the euro 
single currency in Denmark – for the 
British vote, the status quo is the pro-EU 
option. The implications of this subtle but 
important difference are not yet clear, but 
it is true the above evidence challenges the 
conventional wisdom there will be a sharp 
upward turn in support for Remain in the 
final days of the campaign.
Another important question concerns 
the extent to which opinion polls remain 
a reliable measure of public opinion, 
given their collective failure over the 2015 
UK general election. Uncertainty about 
the reliability of polls has been further 
fuelled by the way polls conducted over 
the telephone and online have produced 
two different stories. Online polls have 
suggested the result will be close, whereas 
phone polls have traditionally given Remain 
a healthy lead. This picture, however, could 
be starting to change. Fig 2 above presents 
the results of online and telephone polls in 
the first three months of 2016, revealing 
how the differences between them have 
become less significant. The table also 
reveals how – across all polls – the gap has 
narrowed, although this is most notable in 
the telephone polls.
There are different explanations for 
these variations. Some suggest a ‘social 
desirability bias’ might be occurring, 
whereby people are more willing to record 
support for Brexit online, where they 
have no interaction with another person. 
(This would also help to explain the lower 
percentage of undecided voters in telephone 
polls, who might be less willing to admit to 
another person they have no opinion). Yet 
it is also likely other effects are at work. One 
more plausible reason is the polls continue 
to suffer from an underlying sampling 
problem and are failing to capture the views 
of the ‘hard to reach’ groups in society, who 
may well vote.
An academic enquiry into opinion polls 
and the 2015 general election has already 
suggested that, ahead of that earlier contest, 
samples relied too heavily on younger, more 
socially liberal (and more pro-EU) Labour-
leaning voters. The methods used to collect 
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samples meant pollsters systematically 
over-represented public support for Labour 
while under-representing support for the 
Conservative Party. 
Some suggest that a similar problem is 
now affecting polls on the EU referendum. 
As a pollster recently observed: “It is 
possible the same thing as happened in 
the [general] election with young people 
is happening again with online polls over-
representing the easiest over-65s to reach 
on panels who happen to be more pro-
Brexit than the rest of their age group.”3 
The suggestion of an underlying sample 
problem is reflected in recent analysis of 
polling data, which indicates that online 
polls (which have tended to suggest the 
race is closer) overstate public support 
for Brexit. There are two reasons for this. 
First, online polls almost always provide 
respondents with an explicit ‘don’t know’ 
option, allowing the undecided to avoid 
revealing their vote intention, whereas 
in telephone polls undecided voters are 
compelled to reveal their vote and often side 
with the status quo (the implication being 
that most of the undecided are instinctively 
pro-Remain). Second, online polls may be 
failing to capture ‘harder to reach’ citizens 
who some argue are also more socially 
liberal in their outlook and hence more 
likely to support remaining in the EU.4 Based 
on these two points, some contend that the 
‘real picture’ of public opinion is closer to 
that in the phone polls.
Not every analyst agrees with this view, 
however. For example, some point out how 
the percentage of undecided voters is not 
always higher in online polls and that in 
one online poll that deliberately excludes 
the option of ‘don’t knows’ (conducted by 
ORB), the result has not been significantly 
higher support for Remain. But several 
attempts to drill down and ‘squeeze’ the 
undecided voters have not always produced 
a strong lead for Leave. It is also worth 
remembering that undecided voters are also 
often likely to say that they do not intend to 
vote at all. While this debate will continue 
until and beyond the referendum, two 
additional points should be noted.
First, the polls should continue to be 
treated with caution. Where possible, 
analysts assessing public opinion data 
should try to draw on a wide range 
of information that employs different 
methods. Second, regardless of whether 
you look at the online or telephone polls, 
both now suggest the race is closer than 
it appeared to be a few months ago. Even 
if, once upon a time, the telephone polls 
suggested Remain was heading for an easy 
victory, that is no longer the case. At the 
time of writing, the prospect of Brexit was 
firmly within the margin of error.
Another useful approach is to consider 
larger academic studies of the adult 
population. Since the 1970s, the British 
Social Attitudes surveys have probed public 
attitudes toward Europe. These data are 
often considered to be the ‘gold standard’ 
in survey research. The 2015 results paint 
a picture consistent with the findings of 
telephone polls. While Euroscepticism is 
widespread, with a large majority of voters 
agreeing the EU threatens the distinctive 
3   ‘Some thoughts on the EU referendum polls’, Opinium Research; available online: http://ourinsight.opinium.co.uk/opinium-blog/
some-thoughts-eu-referendum-polls (accessed 29 March 2016)
4   On this point, see the recent Populus report: http://www.populus.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Polls-Apart-29-March-2016.pdf
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identity of Britain, only 30% of respondents 
endorsed withdrawing from the EU.5 
It is also worth noting the longer term 
picture. At no point since the survey started 
to ask this question in 1983 has more than 
45% of the sample voiced support for Brexit. 
Support for remaining in the EU has fallen 
from its early 1990s peak, but remaining in 
the EU is clearly a majority view.
Ultimately, therefore, one’s view of the 
likely outcome will be shaped by assessment 
of the available data. If one believes online 
polls are accurate and social desirability 
may encourage some respondents to 
remain ‘shy’ about their support for Brexit, 
then one may conclude a Brexit is likely. 
Alternatively, if one puts more weight on 
academic surveys and concurs with analysis 
of polling data which suggests public 
support for a Brexit is overstated, then one 
may conclude the referendum will deliver a 
comfortable victory for Remain. 
However, whatever one’s view, there are 
other variables beyond the polls that need 
to be considered.
Cameron’s renegotiation
One important but neglected variable 
has been the impact of David Cameron’s 
EU reform deal, which was designed to 
satisfy public appetite for restrictions on 
welfare for migrant workers and an opt-out 
from ‘ever closer union’. Prior to Cameron’s 
renegotiation, citizens consistently 
identified immigration and restrictions 
on benefits for migrants as their priority. 
In this respect, it is worth returning to 
the British Social Attitudes study. Rather 
than simply asking a binary question – 
‘Would you remain or leave?’; ‘Are you in 
or out?; ‘Would you continue in the EU or 
withdraw?’ – the survey regularly asks a 
representative sample of British adults their 
views about what Britain’s long-term policy 
should be with regard to the EU. 
Hence it offers voters a broader array of 
options – to leave the EU outright, to stay 
and try to reduce EU powers, to retain 
the status quo, to stay in the EU and try 
to increase its power, or to work for the 
formation of a single EU government. 
Fig 3 (right) reveals how, when confronted 
with an array of options, only 22% of 
respondents advocate leaving the EU 
entirely. The most popular answer, at 43%, 
is to stay in the EU and try to reduce its 
power. Overall, a striking 73% advocate an 
option that involves, to varying degrees, 
Britain remaining in the EU, once again 
underlining how the fundamentals of the 
campaign appear to favour Remain. The 
majority of voters are instinctively receptive 
to the idea of remaining in a reformed EU.6 
However, while voters express a desire 
for a reformed EU, evidence has also 
emerged indicating Cameron’s reform 
package has failed to shift support behind 
Remain. Despite the renegotiation efforts 
dominating the media, this appears to 
have had little tangible effect on public 
opinion. In the two weeks following the 
announcement of the deal, which was 
presented in most media as unsatisfactory, 
there was no noticeable rise in support 
for Remain. Support for staying in the EU 
remained static (43%), while Leave lost 
5   The full report is available at http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39024/euroscepticism.pdf
6   BSA data, available from the National Centre for Social Research: http://www.natcen.ac.uk
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one point and the undecided grew by one 
point. Some observers have suggested 
the electorate is not yet ‘tuning in’ to the 
debate, although this sits uneasily with the 
fact that, prior to Cameron’s renegotiation, 
large majorities of voters told pollsters 
they were broadly supportive of his efforts 
to restrict welfare for migrant workers. 
It now appears few voters were swayed 
by the outcome. This lends credence to 
the Eurosceptics’ view they successfully 
neutralised any post-renegotiation bounce.
Immigration versus the Economy
Another variable that may favour Leave 
more than Remain is the broader issue 
of British politics. Euroscepticism has a 
storied past in Britain. In comparative 
surveys, the British have consistently 
been among the least likely to view EU 
membership and the EU in a positive light. 
According to the latest (Autumn 2015) 
Eurobarometer survey, which tracks public 
opinion across the continent, only 30% of 
British adults expressed a positive view of the 
EU, seven points below the EU average. That 
Euroscepticism is widespread is also reflected 
in findings from the latest (2015) wave of the 
British Social Attitudes survey. It suggests 
65% of British adults hold Eurosceptic views. 
The first referendum on Britain’s relationship 
with Europe for more than forty years is thus 
taking place in an environment in which 
Euroscepticism runs deep.
Yet it has also been argued British 
voters are ultimately pragmatic. Though 
instinctively hostile, most acknowledge 
the EU brings important financial benefits. 
Hence some argue the outcome of the 
referendum will be decided by public 
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Fig 3: Attitudes towards Britain’s relationship with the EU 
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anxieties over the potential for Brexit to 
trigger unnecessary economic damage.  
In March 2016, ComRes asked a 
representative sample of British adults how 
much of a risk, if any, a Brexit would be for 
the British economy. 69% of respondents 
thought it would bring risks to the national 
economy, with 30% viewing this as a ‘big 
risk’. Only 12% thought there would be no 
risk at all. Other research points in the same 
direction. According to the British Social 
Attitudes survey, 40% felt the economy 
would be worse off following Brexit, while 
only 24% thought it would be better off. 
There is less evidence to support the idea 
most people think that Brexit would trigger 
a rise in unemployment, however: 25% felt 
that the number of unemployed would rise 
following Brexit, but almost as many (24%) 
thought the number would fall, while 46% 
felt that it would not make much different 
either way. This suggests while most people 
perceive Brexit as having negative effects, it 
concerns the overall health of the economy 
rather than the specific issue of jobs. It is 
also worth noting evidence concerning a 
broader perception associating a Brexit with 
risk. In a recent ORB poll, 82% associated 
Brexit with risk, with nearly one in four 
considering it a “great deal of risk”. 
However, the referendum is not taking 
place amid a climate in which concerns 
over the economy are paramount. On 
the contrary, it is taking place against a 
backdrop of public concern over a different 
issue – immigration. Amid record levels 
of net migration into Britain, surpassing 
300,000 people a year, an EU-wide refugee 
crisis sparked by instability across the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, and 
the specific crisis of migrants attempting 
to enter Britain illegally via Calais, public 
concern over immigration has reached the 
highest levels since records began. 
According to the Ipsos-MORI Issues Index 
that tracks public concerns about issues 
over time, between August and October 
2015 more than 50% of respondents 
consistently identified immigration as 
one of the top three most serious issues 
facing Britain. At the time of writing, 
immigration has been ranked as among the 
most important issues for nine consecutive 
months – 47% of the adult population 
identify immigration and/or race as their 
dominant concern, putting it nine points 
ahead of the health service and 24 points 
ahead of the economy, ranked third. In 
short, the national vote on EU membership 
is taking place amid an environment in 
which concerns over immigration and 
identity are trumping concerns over the 
economy. Such anxieties may well be 
sharpened by an array of ‘external shocks’ 
– terrorist attacks in major European cities, 
an engrained refugee crisis and continuing 
levels of high net migration into Britain. 
The social divide: Remain and 
Leave voters 
The voters likely to determine the 
outcome represent another variable in 
the campaign. Britain’s EU referendum is 
anchored in a deep divide in British society.7 
Those who back Remain or Leave tend 
to have different social backgrounds and 
priorities. Those who intend to vote for a 
Brexit are typically older, less well educated 
7   For a fuller discussion of these divides see Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo (2015) ‘UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw 
the Map of British Politics’, Oxford: Oxford University Press
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and more financially insecure voters from 
the lower middle and working classes. They 
provided the bulk of support to the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and, contrary 
to expectations, remained loyal to that 
party until the 2015 general election. These 
voters are chiefly motivated by concerns 
over immigration and national borders. 
According to work by ORB, Leave voters 
are most likely to say they are using their 
vote at the referendum “to secure control of 
immigration and the UK’s borders”, whereas 
those voting to Remain in the EU are most 
likely to say they are doing so “to secure 
the best economic position for the UK”. 
Currently, undecided voters are slightly 
more likely to cite their desire to protect 
Britain’s economic position, but they also 
cite strong concerns over immigration.
The dominance of immigration among 
Leave voters is also reflected in data 
collected by the British Election Study. 
Leave voters are united in viewing 
immigration as having negative effects. 
Nearly seven in ten argue it has been bad 
for Britain’s economy, a view shared by only 
one in five of those who intend to vote for 
Remain. Nearly eight in ten Leave voters 
also view migration as a burden on the 
welfare state, compared with only around 
one in three of Remain voters. And three 
in four Leave voters believe immigration is 
undermining British culture, while only one 
in four Remain voters endorse this view.8  
Leave supporters are also much more likely 
to align themselves with Englishness rather 
than Britishness. Appeals for English voters 
to turn out for Brexit are likely to resonate.
In contrast, those who intend to vote for 
Remain tend to be younger, to have gone to 
university, to come from the professional 
and managerial middle classes and to have 
higher levels of economic security. They 
appear to be influenced more strongly 
by their desire to protect the national 
economy and their own financial position 
and to voice their more progressive and 
cosmopolitan beliefs. These voters are 
broadly comfortable with EU integration, 
globalisation and immigration, and are 
unlikely to see these broader changes as a 
threat to their own position.
It is important to note variations within 
these two groups. Using data that have 
been gathered together by various polling 
agencies and academic surveys, it is possible 
to talk of four groups of voters who will 
decide the outcome of the referendum: 
1  Hard Remain voters who say they will 
definitely vote to remain in the EU.
2  Hard Leave voters who say they will 
definitely vote for Brexit.
3  Soft Leave voters who say they will 
probably vote for Brexit but could be 
persuaded to endorse Remain. 
4  Soft Remain voters who say they will 
probably vote for Remain but could be 
persuaded to back Leave. 
A brief summary of these four groups 
reveals how popular talk about ‘Remain’ 
and ‘Leave’ masks important differences. 
Hard Remain 
These voters tend to be less than 45 years 
old and come from affluent professional and 
middle classes. They are more likely to be 
8  For further discussion of the British Election Study data and the EU referendum see Matthew J Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo 
(2015) Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: What Drives Euroscepticism? London: Chatham House
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based in London and Scotland and gather 
news and information from broadsheet 
newspapers. These voters primarily 
identify as British and politically align with 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats, Greens or 
nationalists. Hard Remain voters are more 
trusting of Jeremy Corbyn – 45% say they 
trust the Labour leader, followed by David 
Cameron on 33%. Farage is on 6%. These 
voters are most often found in safe Labour 
seats and areas that have disproportionately 
large numbers of ethnic minorities, students 
and public sector workers.
Hard Leave 
These voters are at the opposite end of 
the spectrum. These are the committed 
Brexiteers who tend to be male, aged over 
45 years old and more likely to come from 
the working and lower middle classes. 
They are often based in the Midlands, 
where Eurosceptic attitudes are especially 
strong, and southern England. They identify 
strongly with Englishness and are more 
likely to take tabloid newspapers. At the 
2015 general election, most supported 
the Conservative Party, but they were also 
more likely than any other group to have 
supported UKIP. They describe themselves 
as politically engaged and are more likely 
to be located in safe Conservative seats and 
areas targeted by UKIP – working-class and 
financially disadvantaged constituencies 
with large numbers of pensioners and low 
average levels of education.
Soft Leave 
These voters differ in several respects. 
Unlike their Hard Leave counterparts, those 
only leaning toward Brexit are more likely 
to be female, slightly younger, typically aged 
between 30 and 59 years old, and more 
affluent than their ‘harder’ counterparts, 
being more prominent among the middle 
and higher classes. They appear to have 
‘more to lose’ and are thus more hesitant 
about Brexit. Soft Leave voters are also less 
engaged in politics generally. Whereas 55% 
of Hard Leavers say that they have talked 
about the referendum with friends and 
family, the equivalent figure for Soft Leavers 
is only 35%. They are more likely than Hard 
Leavers to have supported the Conservative 
party at the 2015 general election. Soft 
Leavers lean most heavily toward the 
Conservative Party. Whereas Hard Leave 
voters trust Nigel Farage the most, Soft 
Leavers are most likely to listen to David 
Cameron (47% say they trust him, followed 
by Farage on 34%).
Soft Remain 
The final group of voters is slightly more 
likely to be female, younger and spread 
evenly across social classes. They are most 
likely to read tabloids or no newspapers. 
They are more heavily concentrated than 
Hard Remain voters in England and are 
most likely to be found in northern areas. 
At the 2015 general election, most voted for 
the Conservatives and they were less likely 
than Hard Remain voters to have sided 
with Labour. Again, they are less engaged 
in politics. They are like Soft Leave voters – 
they trust Cameron the most, followed by 
Corbyn and finally Nigel Farage.
Clearly then, the referendum battleground 
will centre on the extent to which the 
Remain and Leave campaigns can cut 
through to respective concerns about the 
economic risk of Brexit versus the perceived 
threats from immigration and rapid social 
change. Much will also depend on the 
extent to which these two soft groups turn 
out on polling day and how individual 
leaders persuade them to cast their vote.
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Turnout and leadership
Turnout could make all the difference 
in a tight referendum. There is evidence 
to suggest Leave voters appear more 
committed to turning out. A recent 
Opinium survey suggested 88% of 
pensioners, who endorse Brexit in larger 
numbers, will ‘definitely vote’, compared 
with only 34% of 18-24 year olds and 39% 
of 25-34 year olds. Among those who at 
least claim they will definitely vote, Leave 
holds a lead of 76% to 59%. 
While a recent TNS survey showed only 
16% of 18-34 year old women ‘definitely 
voting’, it was 79% for men aged over 55, 
who tend to lean toward Brexit. In another 
ORB poll, released in March, Leave held 
a two-point lead over Remain, but once 
intention to vote had been taken into 
account, the lead for Leave extended to 
seven points. Similarly, in the March edition 
of the Ipsos-MORI tracker, Remain held 
an eight-point lead (49% to 41%), but once 
turnout was factored in, it dropped to two 
points (48% to 46%).
While it is not yet clear whether turnout 
differentials will be decisive, it does suggest 
Remain must devote significant effort to 
ensuring younger, more economically 
secure and typically Left-leaning voters 
(who tend to support remaining in the EU) 
turn out. Furthermore, the Leave camp 
may have one other option often glossed 
over in the wider debate: campaigners 
could conduct a ‘dual campaign’, whereby 
more moderate platforms, such as Vote 
Leave, focus on turning out softer and 
more Conservative-leaning Eurosceptics, 
while the UKIP-backed Grassroots Out and 
Leave.EU devote their energy to turning out 
hard Leave voters. 
This brings us to another important 
variable – the role of the widely unpopular 
Jeremy Corbyn, who so far has played 
a minimal role in the campaign. In the 
past, Corbyn has openly criticised the 
EU, suggesting it has moved too far in the 
direction of free market economics at the 
expense of workers’ rights. 
The potential longer term impact of 
this stance, most notably on awareness 
of the Labour position and turnout, is 
reflected in the data. One survey by YouGov 
conducted in March 2016 suggested 43% of 
a nationally representative sample of British 
adults felt they did not know where Labour 
stood on the referendum – 11 points higher 
than the equivalent who did not know 
where the Conservative Party stood. This 
figure increased to 50% among younger, 
typically more pro-EU voters. 
Such findings underline how left-leaning 
and more pro-EU voters may not be 
‘nudged’ into voting to the same extent as 
perhaps they would have been if Labour 
were still under the leadership of Tony Blair, 
A recent survey suggested 88% of pensioners, 
who largely endorse Brexit, will ‘definitely vote’
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Gordon Brown or Ed Miliband. If younger, 
more apathetic and financially secure 
progressives and middle-class professionals 
decide to stay at home on 23 June, this 
could have a decisive effect on the outcome.
A referendum on domestic policy?
The ambivalence of Labour magnifies the 
divisions within the Conservative Party 
over Europe, which will hamper Cameron’s 
ability to assemble a majority coalition. 
Conservative voters typically break in 
favour of Brexit, while the rank-and-file 
Conservative Party membership breaks 
even more heavily for Brexit. Cameron 
will thus become less dependent upon his 
own party than on Left-leaning voters who 
turned out against the Conservative Party at 
the general election. 
This is where, again, the wider climate is 
important. Overall dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent Conservative Party government 
is rising, while recent infighting over 
welfare cuts has added to public perception 
of a divided and unpopular government. 
Such trends could be important given 
referendums are sometimes decided by 
issues not on the ballot. In February, public 
dissatisfaction with the UK government 
hit 60%, the highest level since the general 
election in 2015.9 
The recent budget has also proven 
unpopular. According to the regular Ipsos-
MORI tracker, the percentage of voters 
who agree the government’s policies are 
improving the state of the economy is at its 
lowest point since 2012, at 43%. Meanwhile, 
net satisfaction with the performance 
of the Chancellor, George Osborne, has 
plummeted from zero last summer to -33 
in March. Left-leaning voters who are 
more likely to feel dissatisfied with the 
government and its record on the economy 
may feel reluctant to vote alongside 
Osborne and Cameron, and could be 
tempted to give the Conservative Party a 
‘bloody nose’.
Conclusion and discussion
This report has sought to challenge 
conventional wisdom by suggesting that 
while the fundamentals of Britain’s 2016 
referendum favour Remain, there lies in the 
data a clear and plausible pathway to Brexit. 
This pathway would entail Eurosceptics 
taking advantage of a climate that prioritises 
concerns over immigration and identity, 
maximising turnout on the day among 
Leave voters who appear more determined 
to vote, mitigating the economic concerns 
of soft Remain voters, exploiting the 
continued ambivalence of the Labour 
Party and growing dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent Conservative Party. 
While it may be true online polls are 
overstating the extent of public support for 
a Brexit, it also remains true Remain’s lead 
in telephone polls appears to be declining 
and the gap between the two camps is 
often within the margin of error. Local 
elections in May 2016 will provide a useful 
insight into the ongoing dynamics of the 
referendum campaign, notably how UKIP 
performs in Wales, the engagement of 
Leave-leaning voters in more Eurosceptic 
areas of the country such as the Midlands 
and Eastern England, and general levels of 
turnout among Labour voters. These will 
all provide clues as to the possible level of 
participation on 23 June.
9   These data are taken from the regular Ipsos-MORI tracker of government satisfaction
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